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Abstract
We study fair allocation of indivisible chores (i.e., items with non-positive value) among agents
with additive valuations. An allocation is deemed fair if it is (approximately) equitable, which
means that the disutilities of the agents are (approximately) equal. Our main theoretical contribu-
tion is to show that there always exists an allocation that is simultaneously equitable up to one chore
(EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO), and to provide a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm for computing
such an allocation. In addition, we observe that the Leximin solution—which is known to satisfy a
strong form of approximate equitability in the goods setting—fails to satisfy even EQ1 for chores.
It does, however, satisfy a novel fairness notion that we call equitability up to any duplicated chore.
Our experiments on synthetic as well as real-world data obtained from the Spliddit website reveal
that the algorithms considered in our work satisfy approximate fairness and eciency properties
signicantly more often than the algorithm currently deployed on Spliddit.
1 Introduction
Imagine a group of agents who must collectively complete a set of undesirable or costly tasks, also
known as chores. For example, household chores such as cooking, cleaning, and maintenance need to
be distributed among the members of the household. As another example, consider the allocation of
global climate change responsibilities among the member nations in a treaty (Traxler, 2002). These
responsibilities could entail producing more clean energy, reducing overall emissions, research and
development, etc. In both of these cases, it is important that the allocation of chores is fair and that it
takes advantage of heterogeneity in agents’ preferences. For instance, someone might prefer to cook
than to clean, while someone else might have the opposite preference. Likewise, dierent countries
might have competitive advantages in dierent areas.
Problems of this nature can be modeled mathematically as chore division problems, rst introduced
by Gardner (1978). Each agent incurs a non-positive utility, or cost (in terms of money, time, or general
dissatisfaction), from completing each chore that she reports to a central mechanism. In this paper,
our focus is on designing mechanisms to divide the chores among the agents equitably. An allocation
of chores is equitable if all agents get exactly the same (dis)utility from their allocated chores. Other
fairness properties can, of course, be considered too—for instance, envy-freeness dictates that no agent
should prefer another agent’s assigned chores to her own. While this is not the main focus of our work,
we do consider (approximate) envy-freeness in conjunction with (approximate) equitability.
Equitable allocations have been studied extensively in the context of allocating goods (i.e., items
with non-negative value). When the goods are divisible (or, even more generally, in the cake-cutting
setting), perfectly equitable allocations are guaranteed to exist (Dubins and Spanier, 1961; Alon, 1987).
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EQ1 EQX DEQ1 DEQX
Without PO
Existence Always exists Always exists Always exists Always exists(Proposition 3) (Proposition 3) (Proposition 5) (Proposition 5)
Computation Poly time Poly time Poly time ?(Proposition 3) (Proposition 3) (Proposition 6)
With PO
Existence Always exists Might not exist Always exists Always exists(Theorem 2) (Example 1) (Proposition 5) (Proposition 5)
Computation Pseudopoly time Strongly NP-hard ? ?(Theorem 2) (Theorem 1)
Table 1: Summary of our theoretical results. Each cell contains the existence/computation results for various com-
binations of fairness and eciency properties. Open questions are marked with ‘?’.
For indivisible goods, though, perfect equitability might not be possible, but approximate versions can
still be achieved (Gourvès et al., 2014; Freeman et al., 2019).
At rst glance, the problem of chore division appears similar to the goods division problem. How-
ever, there are subtle technical dierences between the two settings. In the context of (approximate)
envy-freeness, this contrast has been noted in several works (Peterson and Su, 2009; Bogomolnaia et
al., 2018, 2017; Brânzei and Sandomirskiy, 2019). To take one example, it is known that an allocation
of goods that is both envy-free up to one good and Pareto optimal can be found by allocating goods
so that the product of the agents’ utilities—the Nash social welfare—is maximized (Caragiannis et al.,
2019). However, maximizing the product of utilities is not sensible when valuations are negative, and
no analogous procedure is known for the case of chores.
In this paper, we demonstrate a similar set of dierences between the goods and chores settings in
the context of equitability. Our focus is on equitability up to one/any chore (EQ1/EQX) which requires
that pairwise violations of equitability can be eliminated by removing some/any chore from the bundle
of the less happy agent.
For goods division, Freeman et al. (2019) showed that equitability up to any good and Pareto opti-
mality are achieved simultaneously by the Leximin algorithm.1 However, we show that in the chores
setting, Leximin does not even guarantee equitability up to one chore (EQ1) (Example 2). Further, while
we are able to give an algorithm that outputs an EQ1 and PO allocation in pseudopolynomial time (The-
orem 2), modifying a similar algorithm of Freeman et al. (2019), we show that an allocation satisfying
EQX and PO may not exist, in contrast to the goods setting (Example 1).
The fact that EQX+PO could fail to exist and that the Leximin allocation may not be EQ1 leads us to
consider other relaxations of perfect equitability. To this end, we dene the equitability up to one/any
duplicated chore (DEQ1/DEQX) properties. These properties require that pairwise equitability can be
restored by duplicating a chore from the less happy agent’s bundle and adding it to the more happy
agent’s bundle, rather than removing a chore from the less happy agent’s bundle. Interestingly, we
nd that the “duplicate” relaxations are satised by the Leximin allocation (Proposition 5), restoring a
formal justication for that algorithm even in the chores setting. Table 1 summarizes our results.
Finally, we complement our theoretical results with extensive simulations on both simulated data
and data gathered from the popular fair division website Spliddit (Goldman and Procaccia, 2015).2 We
nd that on a large fraction of instances (> 80%), Leximin satises all of the approximate properties
that we consider, in addition to Pareto optimality. We therefore consider it to be the best choice for
use in practice, matching the observation of Freeman et al. (2019) in the case of goods. When the
runtime of the Leximin algorithm is prohibitive (computing the Leximin allocation is NP-hard), our
simulations reveal that our pseudopolynomial algorithm for achieving EQ1 and PO is a reasonable
choice for achieving these as well as other properties on a large fraction of instances.
1The Leximin algorithm maximizes the utility of the least well-o agent, and subject to that maximizes the utility of the
second-least, and so on.
2http://www.spliddit.org/apps/tasks
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1.1 Related Work
Fair division of indivisible chores has received considerable interest in recent years. Aziz et al. (2017),
Huang and Lu (2019), Aziz et al. (2019b), and Aziz et al. (2019c) study approximation algorithms for max-
min fair share (MMS) allocation of chores. Brânzei and Sandomirskiy (2019) show that an allocation
that is envy-free up to the removal of two chores (EF11) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists and can
be computed in polynomial time if the number of agents is xed. Segal-Halevi (2018b) has studied
competitive equilibria in the allocation of indivisible chores with unequal budgets.
Several papers study a model with mixed items, wherein an item can be a good for one agent
and a chore for another. Bogomolnaia et al. (2017) examine this model for divisible items and show
that unlike the goods-only case, the set of competitive utility proles (Varian, 1974; Eisenberg and
Gale, 1959) can be multivalued; for the chores-only problem, the multiplicity can be exponential in
the number of agents/items (Bogomolnaia et al., 2018). Segal-Halevi (2018a) and Meunier and Zerbib
(2019) consider a generalization of the cake-cutting problem to the mixed utilities setting, and study
envy-free divisions with connected pieces. Aziz et al. (2019a) study indivisible mixed items and provide
a polynomial-time algorithm for computing EF1 allocations even for non-additive valuations. For the
same model, Aziz et al. (2019d) provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing allocations that are
Pareto optimal (PO) and proportional up to one item (Prop1). Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi (2019)
consider envy-free/proportional and Pareto optimal divisions that minimize the number of fractionally
assigned items. Notably, none of this work examines equitability for indivisible items.
Equitability for indivisible chores has been studied by Bouveret et al. (2019) in a model where the
items constitute the vertices of a graph, and each agent should be assigned a connected subgraph. This
work does not consider Pareto optimality, and the space of permissible allocations in this model is
dierent from ours, making the two sets of results incomparable. Caragiannis et al. (2012) study the
worst-case welfare loss due to equitability (i.e., ‘price of equitability’) for indivisible chores, but do not
consider approximate fairness.
For goods, equitability as a fairness notion has been studied extensively, mostly in the context of
cake-cutting (Dubins and Spanier, 1961; Brams et al., 2006; Cechlárová and Pillárová, 2012; Brams et
al., 2012; Cechlárová et al., 2013; Brams et al., 2013; Aumann and Dombb, 2015; Procaccia and Wang,
2017; Chèze, 2017). Our work bears most similarity to the work of Gourvès et al. (2014) and Freeman
et al. (2019), who dene the notions of EQX and EQ1, respectively.
2 Preliminaries
Problem instance An instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 of the fair division problem is dened by a set of n ∈ N
agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a set of m ∈ N chores [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, and a valuation prole V =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn} that species the preferences of every agent i ∈ [n] over each subset of the chores in
[m] via a valuation function vi : 2[m] → Z≤0. Note that we assume that the valuations are non-positive
integers; most of our results hold without this assumption but Theorem 2 requires it.
We will also assume that the valuation functions are additive, i.e., for any agent i ∈ [n] and any
set of chores S ⊆ [m], vi(S) :=
∑
j∈S vi({j}), where vi(∅) = 0. For a singleton chore j ∈ [m], we
will write vi,j instead of vi({j}). The valuation functions are said to be normalized if for all agents
i, j ∈ [n], we have vi([m]) = vj([m]). We will assume throughout, without loss of generality, that for
each chore j ∈ [m], there exists some agent i ∈ [n] with a non-zero valuation for it (i.e., vi,j < 0), and
for each agent i ∈ [n], there exists a chore j ∈ [m] that it has non-zero value for.
Allocation An allocation A := (A1, . . . , An) is an n-partition of the set of chores [m], where Ai ⊆
[m] is the bundle allocated to the agent i (note thatAi can be empty). Given an allocationA, the utility
of agent i ∈ [n] for the bundle Ai is vi(Ai) =
∑
j∈Ai vi,j .
3
Equitability An allocation A is said to be (a) equitable (EQ) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], we
have vi(Ai) = vk(Ak); (b) equitable up to one chore (EQ1) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such
that Ai 6= ∅, there exists a chore j ∈ Ai such that vi(Ai \ {j}) ≥ vk(Ak), and (c) equitable up to any
chore (EQX) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ai 6= ∅ and for every chore j ∈ Ai such
that vi,j < 0, we have vi(Ai \ {j}) ≥ vk(Ak). These notions have been previously studied for goods
by Gourvès et al. (2014) and Freeman et al. (2019). Our presentation of the notions of (approximate)
equitability for chores—in particular, the idea of removing a chore from the less-happy agent’s bundle—
follows the formulation used by Aziz et al. (2019a) and Aleksandrov (2018) in dening the analogous
relaxations of envy-freeness (see below).
Envy-freeness An allocation A is said to be (a) envy-free (EF) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n],
we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ak); (b) envy-free up to one chore (EF1) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such
that Ai 6= ∅, there exists a chore j ∈ Ai such that vi(Ai \ {j}) ≥ vi(Ak), and (c) envy-free up to any
chore (EFX) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ai 6= ∅ and for every chore j ∈ Ai such
that vi,j < 0, we have vi(Ai \ {j}) ≥ vi(Ak). The notions of EF, EF1, and EFX were proposed in the
context of goods allocation by Foley (1967), Budish (2011), and Caragiannis et al. (2019), respectively.3
It is easy to see that envy-freeness and equitability (and their corresponding relaxations) become
equivalent when the valuations are identical, i.e., for every j ∈ [m], vi,j = vk,j for all i, k ∈ [n].
Proposition 1. When agents have identical valuations, an allocation satises EF/EFX/EF1 if and only
if it satises EQ/EQX/EQ1.
Pareto optimality An allocation A is Pareto dominated by allocation B if vk(Bk) ≥ vk(Ak) for
every agent k ∈ [n] with at least one of the inequalities being strict. A Pareto optimal (PO) allocation
is one that is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation.
Leximin-optimal allocation A Leximin-optimal (or simply Leximin) allocation of chores is one
that maximizes the minimum utility that any agent achieves, subject to which the second minimum
utility is maximized, and so on. The utilities induced by a Leximin allocation are unique, although
there may exist more than one such allocation (Dubins and Spanier, 1961).
3 Theoretical Results
This section presents our theoretical contributions. We will rst consider equitability and its relax-
ations (Section 3.1), followed by combining these notions with Pareto optimality (Section 3.2), and
subsequently also considering envy-freeness (Section 3.3). Finally, we will discuss a novel approxima-
tion of equitability called equitability up to a duplicated chore (Section 3.4).
3.1 Equitability and its Relaxations
As discussed previously, an equitable (EQ) allocation is not guaranteed to exist when allocating indi-
visible chores. In addition, the computational problem of determining whether a given instance has
an equitable allocation turns out to be NP-complete even for identical valuations (Proposition 2). The
proof uses a standard reduction from 3-Partition and is therefore omitted.
Proposition 2. Determining whether a given fair division instance admits an equitable (EQ) allocation
is strongly NP-complete even for identical valuations.
3An earlier work by Lipton et al. (2004) studied a weaker approximation of envy-freeness for goods, but their algorithm
is known to compute an EF1 allocation.
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The negative results regarding the existence and computation of exact equitability are in complete
contrast with those of its relaxations. Indeed, when allocating indivisible chores, there always exists
an allocation that is equitable up to any chore (EQX). Furthermore, such an allocation can be computed
in polynomial time via a simple greedy procedure (Proposition 3). This algorithm is a straightforward
adaptation of the algorithm of Gourvès et al. (2014) for computing EQX allocations of goods.
Proposition 3. An EQX allocation of chores always exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. (Sketch) Our algorithm iteratively assigns the chores to the agents according to the following
assignment rule: At each step, the happiest agent (i.e., one whose utility is closest to zero) is asked to
select a chore from the set of available chores that it dislikes the most (i.e., the chore that gives it the
most negative utility).
It is easy to see that the chore assigned most recently to any agent is also its favorite (or least
disliked) chore in its bundle. Thus, if an allocation is EQX before assigning a chore, then it continues
to be EQX after it. The claim now follows by induction, since an empty allocation is EQX to begin
with.
The positive result in Proposition 3 oers an interesting comparison between envy-freeness and
equitability: It is not known whether an EFX allocation is even guaranteed to exist for chores, but an
EQX allocation can always be computed in polynomial time.
3.2 Equitability and Pareto Optimality
We will now consider equitability together with Pareto optimality. From Proposition 2, it is easy to
see that checking the existence of an equitable and Pareto optimal (EQ+PO) allocation is strongly NP-
hard (since every allocation is Pareto optimal under identical valuations). Therefore, we will strive for
achieving Pareto optimality alongside approximate equitability, specically EQ1 and EQX.
We will start by considering equitability up to any chore (EQX) and Pareto optimality. For goods
allocation, Freeman et al. (2019) have shown that equitability up to any good and Pareto optimality
can be simultaneously achieved using the Leximin allocation.4 By contrast, as we show in Example 1,
there might not exist an allocation that is equitable up to any chore and Pareto optimal, even when
there are only two agents.
Example 1 (Non-existence of EQX+PO). Consider an instance with three chores c1, c2, c3 and two
agents a1, a2 with strictly negative (and normalized) valuations as shown below:
c1 c2 c3
a1 −2 −50 −50
a2 −97 −4 −1
Of the eight possible allocations in the above instance, the two allocations that assign all chores to
a single agent, namely A1 := ({c1, c2, c3}, {∅}) and A2 := ({∅}, {c1, c2, c3}) violate EQX and can be
immediately ruled out. Any other allocation must assign exactly one chore to one agent and two to
the other.
Of the three allocations in which a1 is assigned exactly one chore, namely A3 := ({c1}, {c2, c3}),
A4 := ({c2}, {c1, c3}), and A5 := ({c3}, {c1, c2}), none satises EQX. Therefore, these allocations
can be ruled out as well.
This leaves us with the three allocations in which a2 is assigned exactly one chore, namely A6 :=
({c1, c2}, {c3}), A7 := ({c2, c3}, {c1}), and A8 := ({c1, c3}, {c2}). Among these, only A7 satises
EQX. However, A7 is Pareto dominated by the allocation A3; indeed, v1(A7) = −100 < v1(A3) = −2
and v2(A7) = −97 < v2(A3) = −5. Therefore, the above instance does not admit an EQX+PO
allocation.
4This result requires the valuations to be strictly positive.
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C1 . . . C3r S1 S2 . . . Sr D1 D2
a1 −b1 . . . −b3r −1 −L . . . −L −L −L
a2 −b1 . . . −b3r −L −1 . . . −L −L −L
...
...
...
...
ar −b1 . . . −b3r −L −L . . . −1 −L −L
d −L′ . . . −L′ −L′ −L′ . . . −L′ −1 −B
Table 2: Chores instance used in the proof of Theorem 1.
To make matters worse, determining whether a given instance admits an EQX and PO allocation
turns out to be strongly NP-hard.
Theorem 1 (Strong NP-hardness of EQX+PO). Determining whether a given fair division instance
admits an allocation that is simultaneously equitable up to any chore (EQX) and Pareto optimal (PO) is
strongly NP-hard, even for strictly negative and normalized valuations.
Proof. We will show a reduction from 3-Partition, which is known to be strongly NP-hard (Garey
and Johnson, 1979, Theorem 4.4). An instance of 3-Partition consists of a set X = {b1, . . . , b3r} of
3r positive integers where r ∈ N, and the goal is to nd a partition of X into r subsets X1, . . . , Xr
such that the sum of numbers in each subset is equal to B := 1r
∑
bi∈X bi.
5 We will assume, without
loss of generality, that for every i ∈ [3r], bi is even and bi ≥ 2. As a result, we can also assume, without
loss of generality, that B is even.
We will construct a fair division instance with r + 1 agents and 4r + 2 chores (see Table 2). The
set of agents consists of r main agents a1, . . . , ar and a dummy agent d. The set of chores consists
of 3r main chores C1, . . . , C3r , r signature chores S1, . . . , Sr , and two dummy chores D1, D2. The
valuations of the agents are specied as follows: For every i ∈ [r] and j ∈ [3r], agent ai values the
main chore Cj at −bj , the signature chore Si at −1, and all other chores at a large negative number
−L, where−L < −rB− 1. The dummy agent d values the dummy chores D1 and D2 at−1 and−B,
respectively, and all other chores at a large negative number−L′. In the interest of having normalized
valuations, we can set L′ := (r−1)B+(r+1)L4r . It is easy to show using standard calculus that−L′ < −B
for all r ≥ 3. Since the condition r ≥ 3 holds without loss of generality, we will assume throughout
that −L′ < −B.
We will now argue the equivalence of solutions.
(⇒) Let X1, . . . , Xr be a solution of 3-Partition. Then, the desired allocation A can be con-
structed as follows: For every i ∈ [r], the main agent ai gets the signature chore Si as well as the
chores corresponding to the numbers in Xi. The dummy agent gets the two dummy chores. The al-
location A is Pareto optimal because each chore is assigned to an agent that has the highest valuation
for it (thus, A maximizes social welfare). Also, each agent’s valuation in A is−B− 1, implying that A
is equitable, and hence also EQX.
(⇐) Now suppose that there exists an EQX and Pareto optimal allocation A. Below, we will make
a series of observations about A that will help us infer a solution of 3-Partition using A.
Claim 1. No agent gets an empty bundle in A.
Proof. (of Claim 1) If an agent gets an empty bundle, then some other agent will get four or more
chores (as more than 4r chores will need to be allocated among r other agents). Since all valuations
are strictly negative, this results in a violation of EQX.
Claim 2. Each main agent ai gets its signature chore Si in A.
5Note that we do not require the setsX1, . . . , Xr to be of cardinality three each; 3-Partition remains strongly NP-hard
even without this constraint.
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Proof. (of Claim 2) From Claim 1, we know that ai owns at least one chore in A. Fix any chore j ∈ Ai.
SupposeSi is assigned to an agent k inA. Notice that the valuation of agent k forSi is either−L or−L′
(depending of whether k is a main or a dummy agent). This is also the smallest valuation that agent k
has for any chore (recall that−L < −rB−1 and−L′ < −B). Furthermore, since−bi ≤ −2 for every
i ∈ [3r], Si is the unique favorite chore of agent ai. Therefore, after exchanging the chores j and Si,
the valuation of agent k cannot decrease (due to additivity), and the valuation of agent ai necessarily
increases. Thus, the new allocation is a Pareto improvement over A, which is a contradiction.
Claim 3. The chore D1 is assigned to the dummy agent d in A.
Proof. (of Claim 3) By an argument similar to that in the proof of Claim 2, we can show that if D1 is
not assigned to d, then a Pareto improving swap between d and the owner of D1 is possible.
Claim 4. The chore D2 is assigned to the dummy agent d in A.
Proof. (of Claim 4) Suppose, for contradiction, thatD2 is assigned to main agent ai inA. From Claim 2,
we know that ai is also assigned its signature chore Si. Since Si is the favorite chore of ai, the EQX
condition requires that for every other main agent ak,
vk(Ak) ≤ vi(Ai \ {Si}) ≤ vi({D2}) = −L.
Even if ak is assigned all the remaining chores whose assignment has not been nalized yet (this
includes the 3r main chores), its valuation will still only be −rB − 1 > −L. This would imply a
violation of EQX condition between ai and ak, which is a contradiction.
From Claims 3 and 4, we know that D1, D2 ∈ Ad. Therefore, by EQX condition, the following
must hold for every main agent ai:
vi(Ai) ≤ vd(Ad \ {D1}) ≤ vd({D2}) = −B.
From Claim 2, we know that ai gets its signature chore Si. Thus, the valuation of ai for the re-
maining items in its bundle must be
vi(Ai \ {Si}) ≤ −B + 1. (1)
Since the assignment of all signature and dummy chores has been xed, the set Ai \ {Si} can
only have main chores. By assumption, main agents have even-valued valuations for main chores. By
additivity of valuations, the quantity vi(Ai \ {Si}) must also be even. Also, −B is even, so −B + 1
must be odd, and therefore the inequality in Equation (1) must be strict. Thus, vi(Ai \ {Si}) ≤ −B.
We can now infer a solution of 3-Partition as follows: For every i ∈ [r], the setXi contains those
numbers whose corresponding chores are included in Ai \ {Si}. Since vi(Ai \ {Si}) ≤ −B, it follows
that all main chores must be assigned among the main agents, implying that X1, . . . , Xr constitute a
valid partition of X . Furthermore, the sum of numbers in the set Xi cannot exceed B, or otherwise
the sum of numbers in some other set Xk will be strictly less than B, which would violate the above
inequality. Hence, X1, . . . , Xr is a valid solution of 3-Partition, as desired.
The negative results concerning the existence and computation of EQX+PO lead us to consider a
weaker relaxation of equitability, namely equitability up to one chore (EQ1). A natural starting point in
studying the existence of EQ1+PO allocations is the Leximin solution, as it yields strong positive results
for the goods setting (Freeman et al., 2019). Unfortunately, as Example 2 shows, Leximin sometimes
fails to satisfy EQ1 (as well as EF1) for chores.
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c1 c2 c3 c4
a1 −1 −5 −5 −5
a2 −1 −2 −2 −11
a3 −6 −5 −3 −2
Example 2 (Leximin fails EQ1 and EF1). Consider the following instance with four chores and three
agents with normalized and strictly negative valuations:
We will show that the allocationA given byA1 = {c1}, A2 = {c2, c3}, andA3 = {c4} is Leximin-
optimal. Suppose, for contradiction, that another allocation B is a Leximin improvement over A. The
utility prole induced byA is (−1,−4,−2), and therefore, for any chore j and agent i such that j ∈ Bi,
we must have that vi,j ≥ −4.
The chore c4 is valued at less than−4 by both a1 and a2, so we must have c4 ∈ B3. Similarly, we can
x c2 ∈ B2. This, in turn, forces us to x c3 ∈ B2, since otherwise if c3 ∈ B3, then the utility of a3 will
be −5 < −4, which would violate the Leximin improvement assumption. By a similar argument, we
have c1 ∈ B1. This, however, implies that A and B are identical, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
A must be Leximin. Notice that A violates EQ1 and EF1 for the pair (a1, a2).
Another natural approach to show the existence of EQ1+PO allocations could be to use the relax-
and-round framework. Specically, one could start from an egalitarian-equivalent solution (Pazner
and Schmeidler, 1978) (i.e., a fractional allocation that is perfectly equitable and minimizes the agents’
disutilities), and use a rounding algorithm to achieve EQ1. However, there is a simple example where
this approach fails.6
The failure of Leximin and the relax-and-round framework in achieving EQ1 prompts us to con-
sider a dierent approach for studying approximately fair and Pareto optimal allocations. This ap-
proach, which is based on Fisher markets (Brainard and Scarf, 2000), has been successfully used in the
goods model to provide an algorithmic framework for computing EF1+PO (Barman et al., 2018) and
EQ1+PO (Freeman et al., 2019) allocations.7 Note that the existence of such allocations was established
by means of computationally intractable methods, namely the Maximum Nash Welfare and Leximin
solutions (Caragiannis et al., 2019; Freeman et al., 2019).
Briey, the idea is to start with an allocation that is an equilibrium of some Fisher market. By the
rst welfare theorem (Mas-Colell et al., 1995), such an allocation is guaranteed to be Pareto optimal.
By using a combination of local search and price change steps, our algorithm converges to an approx-
imately equitable equilibrium, which gives an approximately equitable and Pareto optimal allocation.
An important distinguishing feature of our algorithm is that while the existing Fisher market based ap-
proaches use price-rise (Barman et al., 2018; Freeman et al., 2019), our algorithm instead uses price-drop
as the natural option for negative valuations.
Our main result in this section (Theorem 2) establishes the existence of EQ1 and PO allocations
using the markets framework.
Theorem 2 (Algorithm for EQ1+PO). Given any chores instance with additive and integral valuations,
an allocation that is equitable up to one chore (EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists and can be
computed in O(poly(m,n, |vmin|)) time, where vmin = mini,j vi,j .
In particular, when the valuations are polynomially bounded (i.e., for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],
vi,j ≤ poly(m,n)), our algorithm computes an EQ1 and PO allocation in polynomial time. Whether
6Consider an instance with three chores and three agents. Agents 1 and 2 value the rst chore at −4 and the other two
chores at −∞ (or a suitably large negative value). Agent 3 values the rst chore at −∞ and the other two chores at −1
each. An egalitarian-equivalent solution divides the rst chore equally between agents 1 and 2, and assigns the remaining
two chores to agent 3. Any rounding of this fractional allocation violates EQ1 with respect to agent 3 and whoever of agents
1 or 2 gets an empty bundle.
7Similar techniques have also been used in developing approximation algorithms for Nash social welfare objective for
budget-additive and multi-item concave utilities (Chaudhury et al., 2018).
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Figure 1: Executing the EQ1+PO algorithm from Theorem 2 on the instance in Example 2. The solid (respectively,
dashed) edges denote items that are allocated to (respectively, in the MBB set of) an agent. The edge labels denote
the valuations, and the numbers next to the agent and chore nodes denote the utilities and the prices, respectively.
an EQ1+PO allocation can be computed in polynomial time without this assumption is an interesting
avenue for future research.8
The proof of Theorem 2 is deferred to Section 6.1. Here, we will provide an informal overview
of the algorithm by demonstrating its execution on the instance in Example 2 where Leximin fails to
satisfy EQ1.
Example 3. Consider once again the instance in Example 2. Our algorithm in Theorem 2 works in
three phases. In Phase 1, the algorithm creates an equilibrium allocation by assigning each chore to an
agent that has the highest valuation for it and setting its price to be (the absolute value of) the owner’s
valuation; see Figure 1a. This ensures that the allocation satises the maximum bang-per-buck or MBB
property (i.e., each agent’s bundle consists only of items with the highest valuation-to-price ratio for
that agent). The MBB property guarantees that the allocation at hand is an equilibrium of some Fisher
market, and therefore Pareto optimal.
The allocation constructed in Phase 1 is not EQ1 as a2 gets three negatively valued chores and a1
gets none. So, the algorithm switches to Phase 2, where it uses local search to address the equitability
violations. Specically, if there is an EQ1 violation, then there must be one involving the ‘happiest’
agent, i.e., agent with the highest utility (shaded in green in Figure 1a). The algorithm now proceeds to
transferring the chores, one at a time, from unhappy agents to the happiest agent while ensuring that
all exchanges take place in an MBB-consistent manner. In our example, the chore c1, which is already
in the MBB set of agent a1, is transferred from a2 to a1 (see Figure 1b).
Despite the aforementioned exchange, the allocation is still not EQ1 as {a1, a2} once again consti-
tute a violating pair. Furthermore, the happiest agent is already assigned its unique MBB chore, so no
additional MBB-consistent transfers are possible. Thus, the algorithm switches to Phase 3.
In Phase 3, the algorithm creates new MBB edges in the agent-item graph by changing the prices.
Specically, the price of chore c1 is lowered until one or more of the remaining chores enter the MBB
set of agent a1. Indeed, once the price of c1 is lowered from $1 to $0.4, all other chores become MBB for
agent a1 (see Figure 1c). As soon as the opportunity for MBB-consistent exchange becomes available,
the algorithm switches back to Phase 2 to perform an exchange. This time, chore c2 is transferred from
a2 to a1 (see Figure 1d). The new allocation is EQ1, so the algorithm terminates and returns the current
allocation as output.
Remark 1. We already know from Example 1 that EQX+PO is a strictly more demanding property
combination than EQ1+PO in terms of existence. That is, an EQX+PO allocation might fail to exist even
though an EQ1+PO allocation is guaranteed to exist (Theorem 2). Our results in Theorems 1 and 2 show
a similar separation between the two notions in terms of computation: Although an EQ1+PO allocation
can be computed in pseudopolynomial-time (Theorem 2), there cannot be a pseudopolynomial-time
algorithm for checking the existence of EQX+PO allocations unless P=NP.
8Interestingly, similar questions concerning the computation of EF1+PO or EQ1+PO allocations are also open in the goods
setting (Barman et al., 2018; Freeman et al., 2019).
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3.3 Equitability, Pareto Optimality, and Envy-Freeness
We will now consider all three notions—equitability, envy-freeness, and Pareto optimality—together.
It turns out that the existence result for EQ1+PO allocations does not hold up when we also require
EF1 (Proposition 4).
Proposition 4 (Non-existence of EQ1+EF1+PO). There exists an instance with normalized and strictly
negative valuations in which no allocation is simultaneously equitable up to one chore (EQ1), envy-free
up to one chore (EF1), and Pareto optimal (PO).
Proof. Consider the following instance with eight chores and four agents with normalized and strictly
negative valuations:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8
a1 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10
a2 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10 −10
a3 −73 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
a4 −73 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists an allocation A that is EQ1, EF1, and PO. Then, we
claim that a1 gets exactly one chore in A. Indeed, a1 cannot get three or more chores in A, since that
would result in some other agent getting at most one chore, creating an EF1 violation with respect to
a1. If a1 gets exactly two chores, then either a3 or a4 will create an EQ1 violation with respect to a1.
This is because one of a3 and a4 will necessarily miss out on c1 and therefore have a utility of at least
−7 from the remaining chores. Finally, if a1 does not get any chore, then one of the other agents will
get at least three chores. Because of strictly negative valuations, this will create an EQ1 violation with
a1. Therefore, a1 gets exactly one chore in A. By a similar argument, so does a2.
Therefore, a total of six chores are assigned between a3 and a4. Assume, without loss of generality,
that a3 gets at least three chores. Then, whoever of a1 or a2 misses out on c1 will create an EF1 violation
with respect to a3, giving us the desired contradiction.
Turning to the computational question, we notice that the allocation constructed in the proof of
Theorem 1 is envy-free. Therefore, checking the existence of an EQX+PO+EF/EFX/EF1 allocation is
also strongly NP-hard. We note that the analogous problem in the goods setting is also known to be
computationally hard (Freeman et al., 2019).
Corollary 1 (Hardness of EQX+PO+EF/EFX/EF1). Determining whether a given fair division instance
admits an allocation that is simultaneously X + Y + PO, where X refers to equitable up to any chore
(EQX), and Y refers to either envy-free (EF), envy-free up to any chore (EFX), or envy-free up to one
chore (EF1), is strongly NP-hard, even for normalized valuations.
3.4 Equitability up to a Duplicated Chore
In this section, we will explore a slightly dierent version of approximate equitability for chores
wherein instead of removing a chore from the less-happy agent’s bundle, we imagine adding a chore
to the happier agent’s bundle. In particular, we will ask that pairwise jealousy should be removed
by duplicating a single chore from the less happy agent’s bundle and adding it to the happier agent’s
bundle.
Formally, an allocation A is equitable up to one duplicated chore (DEQ1) if for every pair of agents
i, k ∈ [n] such thatAi 6= ∅, there exists a chore j ∈ Ai such that vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak∪{j}). An allocation
A is equitable up to any duplicated chore (DEQX) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ai 6= ∅
and for every chore j ∈ Ai such that vi,j < 0, we have vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak ∪ {j}).
Proposition 5 (Existence of DEQX+PO). Given any fair division instance with additive valuations, an
allocation that is equitable up to any duplicated chore (DEQX) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists.
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Proof. (Sketch) We will show that any Leximin-optimal allocation, say A, satises DEQX (Pareto opti-
mality is easy to verify). Suppose, for contradiction, that there exist agents i, k ∈ [n] with Ai 6= ∅ and
some chore j ∈ Ai such that vi,j < 0 and vi(Ai) < vk(Ak ∪{j}). Let B be an allocation derived from
A by transferring the chore j from agent i to agent k. That is, Bi := Ai \ {j}, Bk := Ak ∪ {j} and
Bh := Ah for all h ∈ [n]\{i, k}. Since DEQX is violated with respect to chore j, we have that vi,j < 0,
and therefore vi(Bi) = vi(Ai) − vi,j > vi(Ai). Furthermore, vk(Bk) = vk(Ak ∪ {j}) > vi(Ai) by
the DEQX violation condition. The utility of any other agent is unchanged. Therefore, B is a ‘Leximin
improvement’ over A, which is a contradiction.
Thus, Proposition 5 shows that the duplicate version of approximate equitability (DEQX) compares
favorably against the standard version (EQX) in the sense that a DEQX+PO allocation is guaranteed
to exist whereas an EQX+PO allocation might not exist even with two agents and strictly negative
valuations (Example 1).
On the computational side, we nd that a DEQ1 allocation of chores can be computed in polynomial
time via a greedy algorithm.
Proposition 6. A DEQ1 allocation of chores always exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider any xed ordering j1, j2, . . . , jm of the chores. Our algorithm assigns the chore jt in
the tth round. LetAt−1 denote the (partial) allocation at the end of t−1 rounds. The algorithm assigns
the chore jt to the agent it dened as follows:
it ∈ arg maxi∈[n] vi(At−1i ∪ {jt}).
That is, in a thought experiment where each agent gets a copy of the chore jt, agent it has the highest
utility in the derived allocation. It is easy to see that the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
We will now use induction to show that the algorithm maintains a DEQ1 (partial) allocation at
every step. This is certainly true prior to the rst round, since an empty allocation is DEQ1. Suppose
the partial allocations at the end of each of the rst t− 1 rounds, namely A1, . . . , At−1, satisfy DEQ1.
We will argue that the same is true for the (partial) allocation At at the end of the tth round.
Suppose, for contradiction, that At fails DEQ1. That is, there exists a pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] with
Ati 6= ∅ such that vi(Ati) < vk(Atk ∪ {j}) for every chore j ∈ Ati. Then, the chore jt must have been
assigned to agent i, i.e., jt ∈ Ati. Indeed, if jt were to be assigned to any agent in [n] \ {i, k}, then
the DEQ1 violation between i and k would have existed during round t − 1, contradicting the fact
that At−1 satises DEQ1. Furthermore, if jt were to be assigned to agent k, then agent k’s utility in
round t−1 would have strictly exceeded its utility in round t, implying once again that DEQ1 violation
between i and k would have existed in round t − 1, which is a contradiction. Therefore, the chore jt
must have been assigned to agent i in round t.
We can now instantiate the DEQ1 violation condition for the chore jt to get vi(Ati) < vk(Atk∪{jt}).
Note that since jt is assigned to agent i, the bundle of agent k remains unchanged between rounds
t − 1 and t, and therefore Atk = At−1k and Ati = At−1i ∪ {jt}. Therefore, the DEQ1 violation can be
rewritten as vi(At−1i ∪ {jt}) < vk(At−1k ∪ {jt}). This implies that i is not the highest utility agent in
the thought experiment where each agent is assigned a (hypothetical) copy of the chore jt, which is
a contradiction. Therefore, the allocation At must satisfy DEQ1. By induction, the same holds for the
allocation returned by the algorithm.
Unfortunately, the greedy algorithm in Proposition 6 does not guarantee a DEQX allocation. This
stands in contrast to the situation for EQX, which is easily achieved by a greedy procedure. Settling
the complexity of computing DEQX allocations is an interesting question for future work.
The complexity of computing an allocation that satises either DEQ1+PO or the stronger DEQX+PO
also remains open. For DEQ1+PO, a natural approach would be to apply the market techniques used in
Theorem 2, but that would require care as DEQ1 lacks the following “monotonicity” property that EQ1
has: If an allocation is not EQ1, then without loss of generality, there exists a violation with respect to
the happiest agent. The same is not true for violations of DEQ1, which makes the analysis less obvious.
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In Section 6.6, we explore a variant of DEQX, denoted as DEQX0, in which the vi,j < 0 condition is
not imposed on the duplicated chore j. With this modication, we show that computing an allocation
satisfying DEQX0+PO is NP-hard, as well as an equivalent result for the analogous notion of EQX0.
Remark 2 (A tractable special case: binary valuations). An instance is said to have binary valuations
if for every agent i ∈ [n] and every chore j ∈ [m], we have vi,j ∈ {−1, 0}. For this restricted setting,
there is a simple polynomial-time algorithm that gives an EQX+DEQX+EFX+PO allocation, as follows:
If a chore is valued at 0 by one or more agents, then it is arbitrarily assigned to an agent that values
it at 0. The remaining chores, which are valued at −1 by every agent, are assigned in a round-robin
fashion.
4 Experiments
In this section, we will compare various algorithms in terms of how frequently they satisfy dierent
combinations of fairness and eciency properties on synthetic as well as real-world datasets.
For synthetic data, we follow the setup of Freeman et al. (2019) for goods by xing n = 5 agents,
m = 20 chores, and generating 1000 instances with (the negation of) the valuations drawn from
Dirichlet distribution. Additional pre-processing is required to ensure that the valuations are integral
and normalized (see Section 6.7). Recall that integral valuations are required for Theorem 2. None of
our results require normalization, but it is a natural condition to impose in practice.
The real-world dataset consists of 2613 instances obtained from the Spliddit website (Goldman and
Procaccia, 2015), with the number of agents ranging from 2 to 15, and the number of distinct chores
ranging from 3 to 1100. Unlike the goods case, the “task division” segment of Spliddit allows distinct
items to have multiple copies.9 Furthermore, instead of directly eliciting additive valuations (as is the
case for goods), the website asks the users to specify their preferences in the form of multipliers; that
is, given two chores c1 and c2, how many times would a user be willing to complete c1 instead of
completing c2 once.10 As a result, the elicited valuations might not be integral. These design features
force us to make a number of pre-processing decisions (see Section 6.7). In particular, in order to ensure
integrality of valuations and remain as faithful as possible to the Spliddit instances, we have to give up
on normalization.
We consider the following four algorithms: (1) The greedy algorithm from Proposition 3, (2) the
Leximin solution, (3) the market-based algorithm Alg-eq1+po from Theorem 2, and (4) an algorithm
currently deployed on the Spliddit website for dividing chores. The latter is a randomized algorithm
that computes an ex ante equitable lottery over integral allocations (refer to Section 6.7 for details).
Figure 2 presents our experimental results. For each property combination (X-axis), the plots show
the % of instances (Y-axis) for which each algorithm achieves those properties. The rightmost set of
bars present a comparison of the running times. For the Spliddit algorithm, we plot the average values
obtained from 100 runs, and the error bars show one standard deviation around the mean.
Starting with exact equitability, we observe that a very small fraction of instances (< 20% in Splid-
dit and none in Synthetic) admit EQ and EQ+PO allocations, as one might expect.11 For the approximate
notions, the greedy algorithm nds EQX allocations on all instances as advertised (Proposition 3), but
its performance drops o sharply when PO is also required; in particular, for Synthetic data, the greedy
outcome is always Pareto dominated.
Leximin performs remarkably well across the board. In addition to satisfying DEQX+PO on all
instances (Proposition 5), it also satises EQX and EFX on more than 80% of the instances in both
datasets. Unfortunately, it is also the slowest of all algorithms, with an average runtime of ∼140
seconds on Synthetic dataset, compared to <1 second runtime of the fastest (greedy) algorithm.
The market-based algorithm Alg-eq1+po computes EQ1+PO allocations as expected (Theorem 2),
and somewhat surprisingly, also satises DEQ1 (and EF1). However, its performance drops o when
9http://www.spliddit.org/apps/tasks
10For example, doing laundry 2.5 times could be equivalent to washing dishes once.
11An equitable (EQ) and Pareto optimal allocation (PO), whenever it exists, is provably achieved by the Leximin algorithm.
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Figure 2: Experimental results for Synthetic (top) and Spliddit (bottom) datasets.
stronger approximations of EQX/DEQX are required.
The Spliddit algorithm is consistently (and often, signicantly) outperformed by Leximin and Alg-
eq1+po, even on the Spliddit dataset. The reason is that the Spliddit algorithm is perfectly equitable ex
ante but not necessarily EQ1 ex post. As a result, it is better suited for ensuring fairness over time, say,
when the same set of chores are repeatedly divided among the same agents, as noted on the Spliddit
website.
In summary, Leximin emerges as the algorithm of choice in terms of simultaneously achieving
approximate fairness and economic eciency. We nd it intriguing that the same algorithm was also
a clear winner in the experimental analysis of Freeman et al. (2019) for goods, even though it is no
longer provably EQX (or even EQ1). Equally intriguing is the fact that a currently deployed algorithm
is outperformed by well-known (Leximin) and proposed (Alg-eq1+po) algorithms, thereby justifying
the usefulness of analyzing (approximate) fairness for chore division.
5 Discussion
We studied equitable allocations of indivisible chores in conjunction with other well-known notions
of fairness (envy-freeness) and economic eciency (Pareto optimality), and provided a number of ex-
istential and computational results. Our results reveal some interesting points of dierence between
the goods and chores settings. While a modication of the market approach used by Freeman et al.
(2019) to achieve EQ1+PO in the goods setting works for chores, it may be the case that no allocation
satisfying EQX+PO exists in the chores setting. In response to this possible nonexistence, we have
dened two new notions of relaxed equitability, DEQ1 and DEQX, that address equitability violations
by adding chores to bundles rather than removing them. A number of open questions remain regard-
ing the computation of allocations that satisfy these notions (with or without Pareto optimality). It
may also be an interesting topic for future work to consider similar relaxations of envy-freeness in the
chores setting.
In our experimental analysis, we have considered four dierent algorithms for chore division on
both a real-world dataset gathered from the Spliddit website as well as a synthetic dataset. Our exper-
iments present a compelling case that, in practice, Leximin is the best known algorithm for one-shot
allocation of indivisible chores. This is true not only with respect to (relaxed) equitability, but also
(relaxed) envy-freeness and Pareto optimality.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Recall the statement of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Algorithm for EQ1+PO). Given any chores instance with additive and integral valuations,
an allocation that is equitable up to one chore (EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists and can be
computed in O(poly(m,n, |vmin|)) time, where vmin = mini,j vi,j .
Remark 3. Given an instance I and a chore j ∈ [m], let Sj := {i ∈ [n] : vi,j = 0} denote the set of
agents that value j at 0. Then, in any Pareto optimal allocation, j must be assigned to one of the agents
in Sj . The choice of which agent in Sj gets j is immaterial from the viewpoint of EQ1. (Specically,
if A is an EQ1+PO allocation that assigns chore j to some agent i ∈ Sj , then an allocation derived
from A in which chore j is assigned to some other agent k ∈ Sj is also EQ1+PO.) Therefore, in our
discussion on EQ1+PO allocations, we will only focus on strictly negative valuations.
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on the algorithm Alg-eq1+po (presented in Algorithm 1), and spans
Sections 6.1 to 6.5. We will start with some necessary denitions that will help us state Theorem 3, of
which Theorem 2 is a special case.
Fractional allocations A fractional allocation x ∈ [0, 1]n×m refers to a fractional assignment of the
chores to the agents such that exactly one unit of any chore is allocated, i.e., for every chore j ∈ [m],∑
i∈[n] xi,j = 1. We will use the term allocation to refer to an integral (or discrete) allocation and
explicitly write fractional allocation otherwise.
ε-Pareto optimality Given any ε ≥ 0, A is ε-Pareto optimal (ε-PO) if there does not exist an allo-
cation B such that vk(Bk) ≥ 1(1+ε)vk(Ak) for every agent k ∈ [n] with one of the inequalities being
strict.
Fractional Pareto optimality An allocation is fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO) if it not Pareto dom-
inated by any fractional allocation. Thus, a fractionally Pareto optimal allocation is also Pareto optimal,
but the converse is not necessarily true.
ε-EQ1 allocation Given any ε ≥ 0, an allocationA is ε-equitable up to one chore (ε-EQ1) if for every
pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ai 6= ∅, there exists a chore j ∈ Ai such that 1(1+ε)vi(Ai \ {j}) ≥
vk(Ak).
Theorem 3. Given any fair division instance with additive and strictly negative valuations and any
ε > 0, an allocation that is 3ε-equitable up to one chore (3ε-EQ1) and ε-Pareto optimal (ε-PO) always
exists and can be computed in O(poly(m,n, ln |vmin|, 1/ε)) time, where vmin = mini,j vi,j .
When 0 < ε ≤ 1
6m|vmin|3 , we recover Theorem 2 as a special case of Theorem 3 (see Lemmas 16
and 18).
The remainder of this section develops the necessary preliminaries that will enable us to present
our algorithm (Algorithm 1) and the analysis of its running time (Lemma 1) and correctness (Lemma 2).
The detailed proofs of these results are presented subsequently in Sections 6.2 to 6.5.
Market Preliminaries
Fisher market for chores A Fisher market for chores is an economic model that consists of a set
of divisible chores and a set of agents (or buyers), each of whom is given a budget (or endowment) of
virtual money (Brainard and Scarf, 2000). The agents are required to exhaust their budgets (of virtual
money) to purchase a utility-maximizing subset of the chores but do not derive any utility from the
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money itself. Formally, a Fisher market is given by a tuple M = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 consisting of a set
of n agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a set of m divisible chores [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, a valuation prole
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and a vector of endowments or budgets e = (e1, e2, . . . , en).
A market outcome refers to a pair (A,p), where A = (A1, . . . , An) is a fractional allocation of
the m chores, and p = (p1, . . . , pm) is a price vector that associates a non-negative price pj ≥ 0
with every chore j ∈ [m]. The spending of agent i under the market outcome (A,p) is given by
si =
∑m
j=1Ai,jpj . The utility derived by the agent i under (A,p) depends linearly on the valuations
as vi(Ai) =
∑m
j=1Ai,jvi,j .
MBB ratio and MBB set Given a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm), dene the bang-per-buck ratio of
agent i for chore j as αi,j := vi,j/pj . The maximum bang-per-buck ratio (or MBB ratio) of agent i is
αi := maxj αi,j .12 The maximum bang-per-buck set (or MBB set) of agent i is the set of all chores that
maximize the bang-per-buck ratio for agent i at the price vector p, i.e., MBBi := {j ∈ [m] : vi,j/pj =
αi}. Note that the MBB ratios are non-positive.
A market outcome (A,p) constitutes an equilibrium if it satises the following conditions:
• Market clearing: Each chore is either priced at zero or is completely allocated. That is, for every
chore j ∈ [m], either pj = 0 or
∑n
i=1Ai,j = 1.
• Budget exhaustion: Agents spend their budgets completely, i.e., si = ei for all i ∈ [n].
• MBB consistency: Each agent’s allocation is a subset of its MBB set. That is, for every agent
i ∈ [n] and every chore j ∈ [m], Ai,j > 0 =⇒ j ∈ MBBi. Note that MBB consistency implies
that every agent maximizes its utility at the given prices p under the budget constraints.
Proposition 7 presents the well-known rst welfare theorem for Fisher markets (Mas-Colell et al.,
1995, Chapter 16). For completeness, we provide a proof of this result for the chores setting.
Proposition 7 (First welfare theorem). For a Fisher market with linear utilities, any equilibrium outcome
is fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO).
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists an allocation A and a price vector p such that
(A,p) is an equilibrium but A is not fPO. Thus, there exists a fractional allocation, say x, such that
vi(xi) ≥ vi(Ai) for all i ∈ [n] and vk(xk) > vk(Ak) for some k ∈ [n]. Since both x and A are required
to assign all chores, we have that ∪i∈[n]xi = ∪i∈[n]Ai = [m].
By MBB-consistency, we have that vi(Ai) = p(Ai) ·αi for every i ∈ [n], where αi is the MBB ratio
for agent i, and p(Ai) :=
∑
j∈Ai pj is the price of the bundle Ai. Since x is not guaranteed to satisfy
MBB-consistency, we have that vi(xi) ≤ p(xi) ·αi for every i ∈ [n]. Substituting these relations in the
aforementioned inequalities, we get that p(xi)·αi ≥ p(Ai)·αi for all i ∈ [n] and p(xk)·αk > p(Ak)·αk
for some k ∈ [n].
Recall from Section 2 that for each chore, there exists some agent with a non-zero valuation for it,
and for each agent, there exists a chore that it has non-zero value for. This implies that αi < 0 for every
agent i ∈ [n]. Thus, p(xi) ≤ p(Ai) for all i ∈ [n] and p(xk) < p(Ak) for some k ∈ [n]. By summing
these inequalities for all agents, we get that p([m]) =
∑
i∈[n] p(xi) <
∑
i∈[n] p(Ai) = p([m]), which
is a contradiction. Hence, A must be fPO.
MBB-Allocation graph and alternating paths Given a Fisher marketM = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉, let A
and p denote an integral allocation and a price vector forM respectively. An MBB-allocation graph is
an undirected bipartite graphG with vertex set [n]∪ [m] and an edge between agent i ∈ [n] and chore
j ∈ [m] if either j ∈ Ai (called an allocation edge) or j ∈ MBBi (called an MBB edge). Notice that if A
is MBB-consistent (i.e., j ∈ Ai =⇒ j ∈ MBBi), then the allocation edges are a subset of MBB edges.
12If vi,j = 0 and pj = 0, then αi,j := 0.
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For an MBB-allocation graph, dene an alternating path P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , i`−1, j`, k) from
agent i to agent k (and involving the agents i1, i2, . . . , i`−1 and the chores j1, j2, . . . , j`) as a series
of alternating MBB and allocation edges such that j1 ∈ MBBi ∩ Ai1 , j2 ∈ MBBi1 ∩ Ai2 ,. . . , j` ∈
MBBi`−1 ∩ Ak. If such a path exists, we say that agent k is reachable from agent i via an alternating
path.13 In this case, the length of path P is 2` since it consists of ` allocation edges and ` MBB edges.
Reachability set LetG denote the MBB-allocation graph of a Fisher market for the outcome (A,p).
Fix a source agent i ∈ [n] in G. Dene the level of an agent k ∈ [n] as half the length of the shortest
alternating path from i to k if one exists (i.e., if k is reachable from i), otherwise set the level of k to
be n. The level of the source agent i is dened to be 0. The reachability set Ri of agent i is dened as
a level-wise collection of all agents that are reachable from i, i.e.,Ri = (R0i ,R1i ,R2i , . . . , ), whereR`i
denotes the set of agents that are at level ` with respect to agent i. Note that given an MBB-allocation
graph, a reachability set can be constructed in polynomial time via breadth-rst search.
Given a reachability set Ri, we can redene an alternating path as a set of alternating MBB and
allocation edges connecting agents at a lower level to those at a higher level. Formally, we will call a
path P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , i`−1, j`, k) alternating if (1) j1 ∈ MBBi ∩ Ai1 , j2 ∈ MBBi1 ∩ Ai2 ,. . . ,
j` ∈ MBBi`−1 ∩ Ak, and (2) level(i) < level(i1) < level(i2) < · · · < level(i`−1) < level(k). Thus, an
alternating path cannot have edges between agents at the same level.
Violators and path-violators Given a Fisher marketM and an allocation A, an agent i ∈ [n] with
the highest valuation among all the agents is called the reference agent, i.e., i ∈ arg maxk∈[n] vk(Ak).14
An agent k ∈ [n] is said to be a violator if for every chore j ∈ Ak, we have that vk(Ak \{j}) < vi(Ai),
where i is the reference agent. Notice that the allocation A is EQ1 if and only if there is no violator.
Given any ε > 0, an agent k ∈ [n] is an ε-violator if for every chore j ∈ Ak, we have 1(1+ε)vk(Ak \
{j}) < vi(Ai). Thus, an agent can be a violator without being an ε-violator. An allocation A is ε-EQ1
if and only if there is no ε-violator.
A closely related notion is that of a path-violator. Let i and Ri denote the reference agent and
its reachability set respectively. An agent k ∈ Ri is a path-violator with respect to the alternating
path P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , i`−1, j`, k) if vk(Ak \ {j`}) < vi(Ai). Note that a path-violator (along
a path P ) need not be a violator as there might exist some chore j ∈ Ak not on the path P such that
vk(Ak \ {j}) ≥ vi(Ai). Finally, given any ε > 0, an agent k ∈ Ri is an ε-path-violator with respect to
the alternating path P = (i, j1, i1, . . . , j`, k) if 1(1+ε)vk(Ak \ {j`}) < vi(Ai).
ε-rounded instance Given any ε > 0, an ε-rounded instance refers to a fair division instance
〈[n], [m],V〉 in which the valuations are either zero or the negative of a non-negative integral power
of (1 + ε). That is, for every agent i ∈ [n] and every chore j ∈ [m], we have vi,j ∈ {0,−(1 + ε)t} for
some t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Given any instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉, the ε-rounded version of I is an instance I ′ = 〈[n], [m],W〉
obtained by rounding down the valuations in I to the nearest integral power of (1 + ε). That is, the ε-
rounded version of instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 is an ε-rounded instance I ′ = 〈[n], [m],W〉 constructed
as follows: For every agent i ∈ [n] and every chore j ∈ [m],wi,j := −(1+ε)dlog1+ε |vi,j |e if vi,j < 0, and
0 otherwise. Notice that vi,j ≥ wi,j ≥ (1 + ε)vi,j for every agent i and every chore j. We will assume
that the rounded valuations are also additive, i.e., for any set of chores S ⊆ [m], wi(S) :=
∑
j∈S wi,j .
Description of the Algorithm
Given an instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 as input, we rst construct its ε-rounded version I ′ = 〈[n], [m],W〉,
which is then provided as an input to Alg-eq1+po (Algorithm 1).
13Note that no agent or chore can repeat in an alternating path.
14Ties are broken lexicographically.
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The algorithm consists of three phases. In Phase 1, each chore is assigned to an agent with the
highest (i.e., closest to zero) valuation for it (Line 1). This ensures that the initial allocation is integral
as well as fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO).15 (These two properties are always maintained by the
algorithm.) If the allocation at the end of Phase 1 is ε-EQ1 with respect to the rounded instance I ′,
then the algorithm terminates with this allocation as the output (Line 3). Otherwise, it proceeds to
Phase 2.
The allocation at the start of Phase 2 is not ε-EQ1, so there must exist an ε-violator. Starting from
the level ` = 1 (Line 6), the algorithm now performs a level-by-level search for an ε-violator in the
reachability set of the reference agent (Line 8). As soon as an ε-violator, say h, is found (along some
alternating path P ), the algorithm performs a pairwise swap between h and the agent that precedes it
along P (Line 9). Since the swapped chore is in the MBB sets of both agents, the allocation continues to
be MBB-consistent after the swap. If, at any stage, the reference agent ceases to be the highest utility
agent, Phase 2 restarts with the new reference agent (Line 10).
The above process continues until either the current allocation becomes ε-EQ1 for the rounded
instance I ′ (in which case the algorithm terminates and returns the current allocation as the output
in Line 13), or if no ε-violator is reachable from the reference agent (Line 7). In the latter case, the
algorithm proceeds to Phase 3.
Phase 3 involves uniformly lowering the prices of all the reachable chores, i.e., the set of all chores
that are collectively owned by all agents that are reachable from the reference agent (Line 16). The
prices are lowered until a previously non-reachable agent becomes reachable due to the appearance of
a new MBB edge (Line 14). The algorithm now switches back to Phase 2 to start a fresh search for an
ε-violator in the updated reachability set (Line 17).
Analysis of the algorithm The running time and correctness of our algorithm are established by
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 respectively, as stated below.
Lemma 1 (Running time). Given as input any ε-rounded instance with strictly negative valuations,
Alg-eq1+po terminates in O(poly(m,n, ln |vmin|, 1/ε)) time steps, where vmin = mini,j vi,j .
The proof of Lemma 1 appears in Section 6.2.
Lemma 2 (Correctness). Let I be any fair division instance with strictly negative valuations and I ′ be
its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then, the allocation A returned by Alg-eq1+po for the input
I ′ is 3ε-EQ1 and ε-PO for I . In addition, if ε ≤ 1
6m|vmin|3 , then A is EQ1 and PO for I .
The proof of Lemma 2 appears in Section 6.5.
Notice that the running time guarantee in Lemma 1 is stated in terms of time steps. A time step
refers to a single iteration of Phase 1, Phase 2, or Phase 3. Since each individual iteration requires
polynomial time, it suces to analyze the running time of the algorithm in terms of the number of
iterations of the three phases.16 We will use the terms step, time step, and iteration interchangeably.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Algorithm for EQ1+PO). Given any chores instance with additive and integral valuations,
an allocation that is equitable up to one chore (EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists and can be
computed in O(poly(m,n, |vmin|)) time, where vmin = mini,j vi,j .
15Indeed, the said allocation is MBB-consistent with respect to the prices in Line 2, and is therefore an equilibrium outcome
of a Fisher market in which each agent is provided a budget equal to its spending under the allocation. From Proposition 7,
the allocation is fPO.
16Indeed, an iteration of Phase 1 involves assigning each chore to the agent with the highest valuation and setting its
price. An iteration of Phase 2 involves the construction of the reachability set (say via breadth-rst or depth-rst search),
followed by performing a level-wise search for an ε-path-violator, followed by performing a swap operation. An iteration
of Phase 3 involves scanning the set of reachable chores and setting an appropriate value of the price-drop factor ∆. All of
these operations can be carried out in O(poly(m,n)) time.
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ALGORITHM 1: Alg-eq1+po
Input: An ε-rounded instance I ′ = 〈[n], [m],W〉.
Output: An integral allocation A.
. Phase 1: Initialization
1 A← a utilitarian welfare-maximizing allocation
(assign chore j ∈ [m] to agent i if i ∈ arg maxk∈[n] wk,j )
2 p← For every chore j ∈ [m], set pj = |wi,j | if j ∈ Ai
3 if A is ε-EQ1 for I ′ then return A
. Phase 2: Remove EQ1 violations among the reachable agents
4 i← reference agent in A . tiebreak lexicographically
5 Ri ← Reachability set of i under (A,p)
6 ` = 1 . initialize the level
7 whileR`i is non-empty and A is not ε-EQ1 do
8 if h ∈ R`i is an ε-path-violator along the alternating path P = (i, j1, h1, . . . , j`−1, h`−1, j, h) then
9 Ah ← Ah \ {j} and Ah`−1 ← Ah`−1 ∪ {j} . swap j
10 Repeat Phase 2 starting from Line 4
11 else
12 `← `+ 1 . Move to the next level
13 if A is ε-EQ1 for I ′ then return A
. Phase 3: Price-drop
14 ∆← min
h∈Ri, j∈[m]\ARi
wh,j/pj
βh
, where βh is the MBB ratio of h (in I ′) and ARi := ∪k∈RiAk is the set of
reachable chores
. ∆ is the smallest price-drop factor that makes a new agent reachable
15 foreach chore j ∈ ARi do
16 pj ← pj/∆ . uniformly lower the prices of reachable chores
17 Repeat Phase 2 starting from Line 4
Proof. Fix ε = 1
6m|vmin|3 . Given a chores instance I , its ε-rounded version I ′ can be constructed in
O(poly(m,n, ln |vmin|)) time. We run the algorithm Alg-eq1+po on the input I ′. From Lemma 1, we
know that the algorithm terminates in O(poly(m,n, ln |vmin|, 1/ε)) time. Lemma 2 implies that A is
EQ1 and PO for I .
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall the statement of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Running time). Given as input any ε-rounded instance with strictly negative valuations,
Alg-eq1+po terminates in O(poly(m,n, ln |vmin|, 1/ε)) time steps, where vmin = mini,j vi,j .
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 follows immediately from Lemmas 3 and 4, which are stated below.
Lemma 3. There can be at mostO(poly(m,n, 1/ε) lnm|vmin|) consecutive iterations of Phase 2 before a
Phase 3 step occurs.
Lemma 4. There can be at most O(poly(n, 1/ε) ln |vmin|) Phase 3 steps during any execution of Alg-
eq1+po.
The proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4 are provided in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively.
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6.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 relies on several intermediate results (Lemmas 5 to 8) that are stated below.
Lemma 5. There can be at mostO(poly(m,n)) consecutive swap operations in Phase 2 before either the
identity of the reference agent changes or a Phase 3 step occurs.
The proof of Lemma 5 is identical to (Barman et al., 2018, Lemma 13) and is therefore omitted.
Throughout, we will use the phrase at time step t to refer to the state of the algorithm at the
beginning of the time step t. In addition, we will use it andAt := (At1, . . . , Atn) to denote the reference
agent and the allocation maintained by the algorithm at the beginning of time step t, respectively. Thus,
for instance, the utility of the reference agent at time step t is wit(Atit).
Lemma 6. The utility of the reference agent cannot increase with time. That is, for any time step t,
wit(A
t
it
) ≥ wit+1(At+1it+1).
Proof. The only way in which the utility of a reference agent can change is via a swap operation in
Phase 2. By construction, a reference agent can never lose a chore during a swap operation (though it
can possibly receive a chore). Therefore, the utility of a reference agent cannot increase.
Lemma 7. Let i be a xed agent. Consider any set of consecutive Phase 2 steps during the execution of
Alg-eq1+po. Suppose that i turns from a reference to a non-reference agent during time step t. Let t′ > t
be the rst time step after t at which i once again becomes a reference agent. Then, either Ati is a strict
subset of At
′
i or wi(A
t′
i ) < (1 + ε)wi(A
t
i).
Proof. In order for a reference agent to turn into a non-reference agent, it must receive a chore during
a swap operation. That is, agent imust receive a chore at time t and henceAti is a strict subset ofA
t+1
i .
If agent i does not lose any chore between t+ 1 and t′, then the claim follows. Therefore, for the rest
of the proof, we will assume that agent i loses at least one chore between t+ 1 and t′.
Among all the time steps between t+ 1 and t′ at which agent i loses a chore, let τ be the last one.
Let iτ be the reference agent at time step τ . Since the utility of the reference agent is non-increasing
with time (Lemma 6), we have that
wiτ (A
τ
iτ
) ≤ wi(Ati). (2)
Let c denote the chore that agent i loses at time step τ . An agent that loses a chore must be an ε-path
violator (with respect to an alternating path involving that chore). Therefore,
wi(A
τ
i \ {c}) < (1 + ε)wiτ (Aτiτ ). (3)
Since i does not lose any chore between τ and t′, we have
wi(A
t′
i ) ≤ wi(Aτ+1i ) = wi(Aτi \ {c}). (4)
Combining Equations (2) to (4) gives
wi(A
t′
i ) < (1 + ε)wi(A
t
i),
as desired.
Lemma 8. There can be at most O(poly(m,n, 1/ε) lnm|vmin|) changes in the identity of the reference
agent before a Phase 3 step occurs.
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Proof. From Lemma 7, we know that each time the algorithm cycles back to a some agent i as the ref-
erence agent, either the allocation of agent i grows strictly by at least one chore, or its utility decreases
by at least a multiplicative factor of (1+ε). By pigeonhole principle, after every n consecutive changes
in the identity of the reference agent, the algorithm must cycle back to some agent as the reference.
Along with the fact that the utility of the reference agent is non-increasing with time (Lemma 6), we
get that after every mn consecutive identity changes, the utility of the reference agent must decrease
multiplicatively by a factor of (1 + ε). Since there are m chores overall, the utility of any agent can
never be less than mwmin. Hence, there can be at most mn log1+εm|wmin| changes in the identity
of the reference agent during the execution of the algorithm. The stated bound now follows from
ε-roundedness and the fact that 1ln(1+ε) ≤ 2ε for every ε ∈ (0, 1).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. There can be at mostO(poly(m,n, 1/ε) lnm|vmin|) consecutive iterations of Phase 2 before a
Phase 3 step occurs.
Proof. From Lemma 8, we know that there can be at mostO(poly(m,n, 1/ε) lnm|vmin|) changes in the
identity of the reference agent (in Phase 2) before a Phase 3 step occurs. Furthermore, Lemma 5 implies
that there can be at most O(poly(m,n)) swap operations between two consecutive identity changes
or an identity change and a Phase 3 step. Combining these implications gives the desired bound.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The proof of Lemma 4 relies on several intermediate results (Lemmas 9 to 12 and Corollary 2) that are
stated and proved below. It will be useful to dene the set Et of all ε-violators at time step t. That is,
Et := {k ∈ [n] : wk(Atk \ {j}) < (1 + ε)wit(Atit)∀j ∈ Atk},
where it is the reference agent at time step t.
Some of our proofs will require the following assumption:
Assumption 1. At the end of Phase 1 of Alg-eq1+po, every agent is assigned at least one chore.
This assumption can be ensured via ecient preprocessing techniques similar to those used by
Barman et al. (2018). We refer the reader to Section B.1 of their paper for details.
Lemma 9. Let t and t′ be two Phase 3 time steps such that t < t′. Then, Et′ ⊆ Et.
Proof. It suces to consider consecutive Phase 3 steps t and t′ such that all intermediate time steps
t + 1, t + 2, . . . , t′ − 1 occur in Phase 2. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists some agent
k ∈ Et′ \Et. Observe that a non-ε-violator cannot turn into an ε-violator in Phase 3 as the allocation
of the chores remains xed during price-drop. Therefore, the only way in which k can turn into an
ε-violator is via a swap operation in Phase 2. In the rest of the proof, we will argue that if there is
a swap operation at time step τ (where t < τ < t′) that turns k into an ε-violator, then there is a
subsequent swap operation at time step τ +1 that turns it back into a non-ε-violator. This will provide
the desired contradiction.
Suppose that agent k is at level ` in the reachability set when it receives a chore c that turns it into
an ε-violator. Recall that a swap operation involves transferring a chore from an agent at a higher level
` + 1 to one at a lower level `. Furthermore, a swap involving an agent at level ` + 1 happens only
when no agent in the levels 1, 2, . . . , ` is an ε-path violator. Therefore, agent k cannot be an ε-path
violator just before the time step τ . In other words, there must exist a chore c′ on an alternating path
from the reference agent iτ to agent k such that
(1 + ε)wiτ (A
τ
iτ
) ≤ wk(Aτk \ {c′}). (5)
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Since agent k becomes an ε-violator (and hence an ε-path violator) after receiving the chore c, we have
wk(A
τ
k ∪ {c} \ {c′}) < (1 + ε)wiτ+1(Aτ+1iτ+1)
= (1 + ε)wiτ (A
τ
iτ
),
where the equality follows from the observation that neither the identity nor the allocation of the
reference agent changes during the above swap. Note that the swap involving c does not aect the
alternating path to agent k that includes the chore c′. This means that agent k now becomes the only
ε-path-violator at level ` or below. Therefore, in a subsequent swap operation at time step τ + 1, the
algorithm will take c′ away from agent k, resulting in a new bundle Aτ+1k = Aτk ∪ {c} \ {c′}. From
Equation (5), we get that agent k is a non-ε-violator up to the removal of the chore c, as desired.
Lemma 10. Let t and t′ be two Phase 3 time steps such that t < t′. Then, for any k ∈ Et′ , At′k ⊆ Atk.
Proof. (Sketch.) Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a chore c ∈ At′k \ Atk. The only way
in which agent k could have acquired the chore c is via a swap operation at time step τ for some
t < τ < t′. Thus, agent k cannot be an ε-path-violator just before the time step τ , and therefore also
cannot be an ε-violator. By an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 9, it follows that agent
k cannot be an ε-violator at time step t′, giving us the desired contradiction.
Lemma 11. For any Phase 3 time step t, Et ∩Rit = ∅.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists some k ∈ Et ∩ Rit at time step t, i.e., k is an ε-
violator that is reachable (via some alternating path). Then, agent k must also be an ε-path violator,
implying that the algorithm continues to be in Phase 2 at time step t and therefore cannot enter Phase
3.
Lemma 12. Let t be a Phase 3 time step. Then, there exists an ε-violator k ∈ Et and a chore j ∈ Atk such
that for every agent i ∈ [n], βti ≥ wi,j/|wk,j |, where βti is the MBB ratio of agent i at time step t.
Proof. Note that the algorithm enters Phase 3 at time step t only if the current allocation At is not
ε-EQ1. Thus, there must exist an ε-violator agent k ∈ Et. Fix any chore j ∈ Atk (this is well-dened
since Atk 6= ∅). From Lemmas 9 and 10, we know that k ∈ Eτ and j ∈ Aτk for all Phase 3 time steps
τ < t. Additionally, for every Phase 3 time step τ preceding the time step t, we know from Lemma 11
that k /∈ Riτ . In other words, the agent k never experiences a price-drop between the start of the
algorithm and the time step t. As a result, the MBB ratio of agent k at time step t is the same as
that at the time of the rst price-drop, i.e., βtk = β
t1
k , where t1 denotes the earliest Phase 3 time step.
Furthermore, since the MBB ratios of all agents remain unchanged during Phase 2, we must have that
βt1k = −1 (this follows from the way we set the initial prices in Phase 1), and thus also βtk = −1. By
a similar argument, the chore j does not experience a price-drop between the start of the algorithm
and the time step t. Therefore, ptj = p
t1
j . Since the allocation maintained by the algorithm is always
MBB-consistent, we get that pt1j = |wk,j |. The claim now follows by noticing that each agent’s MBB
ratio is at least its bang-per-buck ratio for the chore j.
Corollary 2. Let t be a Phase 3 time step. Then, for every agent i ∈ [n], we have βti ≥ wmin, where βti is
the MBB ratio of agent i at time step t and wmin = mini,j wi,j .
Proof. Let k ∈ Et be an ε-violator at time t, and let j ∈ Atk be a chore owned by k. From Lemma 12,
we know that for every agent i ∈ [n], βti ≥ wi,j/|wk,j |, where βti is the MBB ratio of agent i at time step
t. Since wi,j ≥ wmin, we get that βti ≥ wmin/|wk,j | = −|wmin|/|wk,j |.
By assumption, all valuations in the original instance I are strictly negative and integral. This
means that in the ε-rounded version I ′, for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], we have −1 ≥ vi,j ≥ wi,j .
Therefore, |wk,j | ≥ 1, or, equivalently, −1|wk,j | ≥ −1. Using this bound in the above inequality, we get
that βti ≥ −|wmin| = wmin, as desired.
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We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. There can be at most O(poly(n, 1/ε) ln |vmin|) Phase 3 steps during any execution of Alg-
eq1+po.
Proof. The proof uses a potential function argument. For any Phase 3 time step t, we dene a potential
Φt :=
∑
i∈[n] log1+ε |βti |,
where βti := maxj∈[m] wi,j/ptj is the MBB ratio of agent i and ptj is the price of chore j at time step t.
In Phase 1, the price of every chore is set to be the absolute value of the highest valuation for that
chore. Along with Assumption 1, this implies that at the end of Phase 1, the MBB ratio of every agent
equals −1. Since Phase 2 does not aect the prices, the MBB ratio of every agent at the time of the
earliest price-drop also equals −1. Thus, the initial value of the potential Φ1 is 0.
We will now argue that each time the algorithm performs a price-drop, the potential must increase
by at least 1 (i.e., for any two Phase 3 steps t and t′ such that t < t′, Φt′ − Φt ≥ 1). Recall that the
valuations are strictly negative. Also, the prices are always strictly positive, and are non-increasing
with time. Therefore, all bang-per-buck ratios (and hence all MBB ratios) are always strictly negative
and are non-increasing with time. Consequently, for any agent i, |βti | is non-decreasing with time.
Thus, Φt ≥ 0 for all time steps t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. In addition, each time the algorithm performs a price-
drop, the MBB ratio of some agent strictly decreases (because a new chore gets added to the MBB set
of some agent).
We will argue that the (multiplicative) drop in MBB ratio is always by a positive integral power of
(1+ε). Indeed, by assumption, all valuations are (negative of) integral powers of (1+ε). We observed
earlier that all MBB ratios at the end of Phase 1 are equal to −1, which means that all initial prices
must be integral powers of (1 + ε). Furthermore, the price-drop factor ∆ is a ratio of bang-per-buck
ratios, and is therefore also an integral power of (1 + ε). So, whenever the MBB ratio of some agent
strictly decreases, it must do so by an integral power of (1 + ε). After each price-drop in Phase 3, the
potential must therefore increase by at least 1.
All that remains to be shown is an upper bound on the potential Φt. From Corollary 2, we know
that for every Phase 3 time step t, we have βti ≥ wmin, and consequently, Φt ≤ n log1+ε |wmin|. Since
the potential increases by at least 1 between any consecutive price-drops, the overall number of Phase
3 time steps can be at most n log1+ε |wmin|. For ε-rounded valuations, we have |wmin| ≤ (1 + ε)|vmin|,
and therefore n log1+ε |wmin| = n+ n log1+ε |vmin|. The stated bound now follows by observing that
1
ln(1+ε) ≤ 2ε for every ε ∈ (0, 1).
6.5 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of Lemma 2 relies on several intermediate results (Lemmas 13, 14 and 16 to 18) as stated
below.
Lemma 13. Given as input any ε-rounded instance I ′ with strictly negative valuations, the allocation A
returned by Alg-eq1+po is ε-EQ1 and fPO for I ′.
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that Alg-eq1+po is guaranteed to terminate. Furthermore, the algo-
rithm can only terminate in Lines 3 or 13. In both cases, the allocation A returned by the algorithm is
guaranteed to be ε-EQ1 with respect to the input instance I ′.
To see why A is fPO, note that Alg-eq1+po always maintains an MBB-consistent allocation (with
respect to the current prices). Dene a Fisher market where each agent is assigned a budget equal to
its spending under A. Then, the outcome (A,p) satises the equilibrium conditions for this market.
Therefore, from Proposition 7, A is fPO.
Lemma 14. Let I be any fair division instance and I ′ be its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then,
an allocation A that is fPO for I ′ is ε-PO for I .
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Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that A is ε-Pareto dominated in I by an allocation B, i.e., vk(Bk) ≥
1
(1+ε)vk(Ak) for every agent k ∈ [n] and vi(Bi) > 1(1+ε)vi(Ai) for some agent i ∈ [n]. Since I ′ is
an ε-rounded version of I , we have that vi,j ≥ wi,j ≥ (1 + ε)vi,j for every agent i and every chore
j. Using this bound and the additivity of valuations, we get that wk(Bk) ≥ wk(Ak) for every agent
k ∈ [n] and wi(Bi) > wi(Ai) for some agent i ∈ [n]. Thus, B Pareto dominates A in the instance I ′,
which is a contradiction since A is fPO (hence PO) for I ′.
Lemma 15. Let p denote the price-vector right after the termination of Alg-eq1+po. Let βk denote the
MBB ratio of agent k ∈ [n] in I ′ with respect to p. Then, βk ≥ −|wmin|2.
Proof. Let t1, . . . , tN denote the Phase 3 time steps during the execution of the algorithm. Let βtNk
denote the MBB ratio of agent k before the price-drop at tN takes place, and let ∆N denote the (mul-
tiplicative) price-drop factor at time step tN . In addition, let i denote the reference agent at tN . For
every agent k that is reachable at tN (i.e., k ∈ RtNi ), we have that βk = βtNk ·∆N . Similarly, for every
k /∈ RtNi , βk = βtNk .
We know from Corollary 2 that βtNk ≥ wmin. Since βtNk < 0, it suces to prove that ∆N ≤ |wmin|.
By denition, ∆N ≤ wh,j/p
tN
j
β
tN
h
for every agent h ∈ Ri and every chore j ∈ [m] \ ARi ; here,
ARi := ∪h∈RiAh is the set of reachable chores at tN . Recall from the proof of Lemma 4 that all MBB
ratios are initially equal to −1 and are non-increasing with time. Thus, βtNh ≤ −1. This implies that
∆N ≤ wh,j/p
tN
j
β
tN
h
=
|wh,j |
p
tN
j ·|β
tN
h |
≤ |wmin|
p
tN
j
.
The above inequality holds for every chore j that is not reachable at time step tN . In particular, we can
choose j to any chore owned by an ε-violator k at tN . Note that our choice of j is well-dened: Indeed,
such an agent k must exist because the allocation is not ε-EQ1 when the algorithm enters Phase 3 at
tN . Furthermore, since agent k is an ε-violator, it must own at least one chore.
By an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 12, we get that ptNj = p
t1
j = |wk,j | ≥ 1, where
the inequality follows from the integrality of valuations. Substituting ptNj ≥ 1 gives ∆N ≤ |wmin|, as
desired.
Lemma 16. Let I be any fair division instance and I ′ be its ε-rounded version for any 0 < ε ≤ 1
6m|vmin|3 .
Let A be the allocation returned by Alg-eq1+po for the input instance I ′. Then, A is PO for I .
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that the allocation A is Pareto dominated by an allocation B in the
instance I . That is, vk(Bk) ≥ vk(Ak) for every agent k ∈ [n] and vi(Bi) > vi(Ai) for some agent
i ∈ [n]. Since the valuations in I are integral, we have vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) + 1.
Let p denote the price-vector right after the termination of Alg-eq1+po. Let αk and βk denote the
MBB ratios (with respect top) of agent k ∈ [n] in I and I ′ respectively. That is, αk = maxj∈[m] vk,j/pj
and βk = maxj∈[m]wk,j/pj . Since I ′ is an ε-rounded version of I , we have vk,j ≥ wk,j ≥ (1 + ε)vk,j
for every agent k ∈ [n] and every chore j ∈ [m]. Thus, αk ≥ βk ≥ (1 + ε)αk. Now consider the
allocation B. By denition of MBB ratio, we have that for every k ∈ [n], βkp(Bk) ≥ wk(Bk), or,
equivalently, p(Bk) ≤ wk(Bk)βk (since βk < 0).
The combined spending over all the chores is given by
p([m]) =
∑
k∈[n] p(Bk) (since all the chores are allocated under B)
= p(Bi) +
∑
k∈[n]\{i} p(Bk)
≤ wi(Bi)βi +
∑
k 6=i
wk(Bk)
βk
≤ (1 + ε)
(
vi(Bi)
βi
+
∑
k 6=i
vk(Bk)
βk
)
(using wk(Ak) ≥ (1 + ε)vk(Ak) and βk < 0)
26
≤ (1 + ε)
(
vi(Ai)+1
βi
+
∑
k 6=i
vk(Ak)
βk
)
(using Pareto dominance and βk < 0)
= (1 + ε)
(
1
βi
+
∑
k
vk(Ak)
βk
)
≤ (1 + ε)
(
1
βi
+
∑
k
wk(Ak)
βk
)
(using vk(Ak) ≥ wk(Ak) and βk < 0)
= (1 + ε)
(
1
βi
+ p([m])
)
(since A is MBB-consistent in I ′).
Simplifying the above relation gives
(1 + ε) · −1βi ≤ ε(p([m])
⇒(1 + ε) · 1|wmin|2 ≤ ε ·m · |wmin| (using Lemma 15)
⇒ 1
m·|wmin|3 ≤
ε
1+ε
⇒ 1
m·|vmin|3·(1+ε)3 ≤
ε
1+ε (using ε-roundedness)
⇒ 1
m·|vmin|3 ≤ ε(1 + ε)
2
⇒ 1
m·|vmin|3 ≤ 4ε (since (1 + ε)2 < 4 for ε ∈ (0, 1)),
which contradicts the assumed bound on ε. Thus, A is PO for I .
Lemma 17. Let I be any fair division instance and I ′ be its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then,
an allocation A that is ε-EQ1 for I ′ is 3ε-EQ1 for I .
Proof. Since A is ε-EQ1 for I ′, we have that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], either 1(1+ε)wk(Ak) ≥
wi(Ai) or there exists a chore j ∈ Ak such that 1(1+ε)wk(Ak \ {j}) ≥ wi(Ai). By ε-roundedness, we
have that vi,j ≥ wi,j ≥ (1 + ε)vi,j for every agent i and every chore j. Along with the additivity of
valuations (in I ′), this implies that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], either vk(Ak) ≥ (1 + ε)2vi(Ai)
or there exists a chore j ∈ Ak such that vk(Ak \ {j}) ≥ (1 + ε)2vi(Ai).
Since 0 < ε < 1, we have that ε2 < ε. Furthermore, since vi(Ai) < 0, we have that ε2vi(Ai) >
εvi(Ai). Substituting this in the above inequalities gives us that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], either
vk(Ak) ≥ (1 + 3ε)vi(Ai) or there exists a chore j ∈ Ak such that vk(Ak \ {j}) ≥ (1 + 3ε)vi(Ai), as
desired.
Lemma 18. Given any fair division instance I and any 0 ≤ ε ≤ 16m|vmin| , an allocation A is 3ε-EQ1 forI if and only if it is EQ1 for I .
Proof. Since A is 3ε-EQ1 for I , we have that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], either vk(Ak) ≥
(1 + 3ε)vi(Ai) or there exists a chore j ∈ Ak such that vk(Ak \ {j}) ≥ (1 + 3ε)vi(Ai). Using the
bound ε ≤ 16m|vmin| , we get that either vi(Ai)− vk(Ak) ≤
1
2 or there exists a chore j ∈ Ak such that
vi(Ai)−vk(Ak \{j}) ≤ 12 . Since the valuations are integral, this implies that either vi(Ai)−vk(Ak) ≤
0 or there exists a chore j ∈ Ak such that vi(Ai) − vk(Ak \ {j}) ≤ 0, which is the desired EQ1
condition.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Correctness). Let I be any fair division instance with strictly negative valuations and I ′ be
its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then, the allocation A returned by Alg-eq1+po for the input
I ′ is 3ε-EQ1 and ε-PO for I . In addition, if ε ≤ 1
6m|vmin|3 , then A is EQ1 and PO for I .
Proof. The allocation A returned by Alg-eq1+po is guaranteed to be ε-EQ1 and fPO with respect to
the input instance I ′ (Lemma 13). Lemmas 14 and 17 together imply that A is 3ε-EQ1 and ε-PO for I .
Furthermore, if ε ≤ 1
6m|vmin|3 , then the bounds in Lemmas 16 and 18 are satised, which implies that
A is EQ1 and PO for I .
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6.6 EQX and DEQX without the vi,j < 0 Condition
In this section, we will consider alternative versions of EQX and DEQX notions wherein the vi,j < 0
condition is removed.
Formally, an allocationA is equitable up to any possibly zero-valued chore (EQX0) if for every pair of
agents i, k ∈ [n] such thatAi 6= ∅ and for every chore j ∈ Ai, we have vi(Ai\{j}) ≥ vk(Ak). Similarly,
an allocation A is equitable up to any possibly zero-valued duplicated chore (DEQX0) if for every pair of
agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ai 6= ∅ and for every chore j ∈ Ai, we have vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak ∪{j}). Notice
that an EQX0 (respectively, DEQX0) allocation is also EQX (respectively, DEQX). The converse might
not be true in general, but it does hold when agents have strictly negative valuations (i.e., vi,j < 0 for
all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]).
Recall from Theorem 1 that checking the existence of EQX+PO is strongly NP-hard even for strictly
negative valuations. It readily follows that the same is true for EQX0+PO allocations as well.
Corollary 3 (Hardness of EQX0+PO). Determining whether a given instance admits an allocation that
is equitable up to any possibly zero-valued chore (EQX0) and Pareto optimal (PO) is strongly NP-hard.
We know from Proposition 5 that a DEQX+PO allocation is guaranteed to exist. By contrast, a
DEQX0+PO allocation might not always exist, and checking the existence of such allocations is strongly
NP-hard.
Lemma 19 (Hardness of DEQX0+PO). Determining whether a given instance admits an allocation that
is equitable up to any possibly zero-valued duplicated chore (DEQX0) and Pareto optimal (PO) is strongly
NP-hard.
Proof. We will show a reduction from 3-Partition. An instance of 3-Partition consists of a set
X = {b1, . . . , b3r} of 3r positive integers where r ∈ N, and the goal is to nd a partition of X into r
subsets X1, . . . , Xr such that the sum of numbers in each subset is equal to B := 1r
∑
bi∈X bi.
17 We
will assume, without loss of generality, that for every i ∈ [3r], bi is even and bi ≥ 2.
We will construct a chore division instance with r agents a1, . . . , ar and 4r chores c1, . . . , c4r . For
every i ∈ [r] and j ∈ [3r], agent ai values chore cj at −bj . In addition, agent ai values the chore c3r+i
at 0, and every other chore in {c3r+1, . . . , c4r} \ {c3r+i} at −1.
(⇒) SupposeX1, . . . , Xr is a solution of 3-Partition. Then, we can construct a perfectly equitable
(and therefore also DEQX0) and Pareto optimal allocation as follows: For every i ∈ [r] and j ∈ [3r],
Ai = {cj : bj ∈ Xi} ∪ {c3r+i}.
(⇐) Now suppose there exists an allocationA that is DEQX0+PO, but the instance of 3-Partition
does not have a solution. For every i ∈ [r], the chore c3r+i must be assigned to agent i under any
Pareto optimal allocation. Regardless of how the remaining chores c1, . . . , c3r are allocated, it must be
the case that there exist agents i, k with vi(Ai) > vk(Ak). All goods of non-zero value owned by an
agent are valued at an even number. In particular, the quantities vi(Ai) and vk(Ak) are even, and so
is their dierence. Furthermore, since vi({c3r+k}) = −1, we have that vi(Ai ∪ {c3r+k}) > vk(Ak),
implying that A violates DEQX0—a contradiction.
We remark that the proof of Lemma 19 can also be used to show strong NP-hardness of checking
the existence of an EFX0+PO allocation, where EFX0 is the analogue of EFX without the vi,j < 0
condition. That is, an allocation A is EFX0 if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ai 6= ∅ and
for every chore j ∈ Ai, we have vi(Ai \ {j}) ≥ vi(Ak).
In the remainder of this section, we will show that checking the existence of EQX0+PO allocations
remains NP-hard even for the special case of binary valuations (Theorem 4). Recall that a chores in-
stance is said to have binary valuations if for every agent i ∈ [n] and every chore j ∈ [m], we have
vi,j ∈ {−1, 0}. We will write Γ := {j ∈ [m] : vi,j = 0 for some agent i ∈ [n]} to denote the set of
17We do not require the sets X1, . . . , Xr to be of cardinality three each; 3-Partition remains strongly NP-hard even
without this constraint.
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chores that are valued at 0 by one or more agents. It is easy to see that for binary valuations, a neces-
sary and sucient condition for an allocation to be Pareto optimal is that each chore in Γ is assigned
to an agent that values it at 0. As a consequence, for binary valuations, one can check in polynomial
time whether a given allocation satises Pareto optimality.
Theorem 4 (Hardness of EQX0+PO for binary valuations). Determining whether a given instance
with binary valuations admits an allocation that is equitable up to any possibly zero-valued chore (EQX0)
and Pareto optimal (PO) is NP-complete.
Proof. We will show a reduction from Vertex Cover, which is known to be NP-complete (Garey and
Johnson, 1979). An instance of Vertex Cover consists of a graph G = (V,E) and a positive integer
k ≤ |V |. The goal is determine whether G admits a vertex cover of size at most k (i.e., a set V ′ ⊆ V
such that |V ′| ≤ k and for every edge e ∈ E, there exists a vertex v ∈ V ′ that is adjacent to e in the
graph G). We will use r := |V | and s := |E| to denote the number of vertices and edges in the graph
G, respectively.
We will construct a fair division instance with r vertex agents, denoted by a1, . . . , ar , and r+s−k
chores. The set of chores consists of s edge chores C1, . . . , Cs and r−k dummy choresD1, . . . , Dr−k.
Each dummy chore is valued at −1 by all agents. Additionally, for every i ∈ [r] and every j ∈ [s], the
edge chore Cj is valued at 0 by the vertex agent ai if the vertex vi is adjacent to the edge ej ∈ E in
the graph G (i.e., vi ∈ ej), and at −1 otherwise.
(⇒) Suppose V ′ ⊆ V is a vertex cover of size at most k. Then, the desired allocation, sayA, can be
constructed as follows: For every j ∈ [s], the edge chore Cj is assigned to vertex agent ai if the vertex
vi is in the vertex cover and the edge ej is adjacent to vi, i.e., vi ∈ V ′ and vi ∈ ej .18 The dummy chores
are assigned uniformly among the r − k agents whose corresponding vertices are not included in the
vertex cover.
The allocation constructed above satises the sucient condition for Pareto optimality, so we only
need to check for EQX0. Notice that the utility of an agent in the allocation A is either 0 (for agents
who get the edge chores) or −1 (for agents who get the dummy chores). For any pair of agents ai, ak
such that vi(Ai) < vk(Ak), it must be that vi(Ai) = −1 and vk(Ak) = 0. Then, by construction, agent
ai gets exactly one (dummy) chore, i.e., |Ai| = 1. In that case, we have that for every chore c ∈ Ai,
vi(Ai \ {c}) = 0 ≥ vk(Ak), implying that A is EQX0.
(⇐) Now suppose there exists an EQX0+PO allocation A. Then, A must satisfy the necessary
condition for Pareto optimality, that is, any chore that is valued at zero by one or more agents must
be assigned to some agent that values it at 0. Thus, any edge chore Cj is assigned to a vertex agent ai
such that vi ∈ ej . This, in turn, means that if an agent does not get a dummy chore, then its utility
must be 0.
We claim that no agent can be assigned more than one dummy chore. Suppose, for contradiction,
that agent ai gets two or more dummy chores. Then, vi(Ai) ≤ −2. Since the number of dummy
chores is strictly smaller than the number of agents, some agent, say ak, must miss out on getting a
dummy chore. Then, by the above observation, we must have that vk(Ak) = 0. This, however, creates
a violation of EQX0, since vi(Ai \ {c}) ≤ −1 for every chore c ∈ Ai because of binary valuations.
Therefore, each dummy chore must be assigned to a distinct agent. We will writeND to denote the set
of all agents that are assigned a dummy chore in A. Notice that |ND| = r − k.
We will now argue that no agent in ND is assigned an edge chore. Indeed, if some agent ai ∈ ND
gets an edge chore Cj , then from EQX0 condition, we have that for any other agent ak,
vi(Ai \ {Cj}) ≥ vk(Ak). (6)
In particular, Equation (6) should hold for any ak ∈ [n]\ND . By the above observation, all edge chores
are assigned to agents that value them at 0, thus vi({Cj}) = 0. Substituting this in Equation (6) gives
that vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak), which is a contradiction because vi(Ai) = −1 (ai gets a dummy chore) and
18If multiple vertex agents t this description, then pick one arbitrarily.
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vk(Ak) = 0 (ak does not get any dummy chore). Thus, all edge chores must be assigned to agents in
the set [n] \ND , which consists of k agents.
Dene V ′ := {vi ∈ V : ai gets an edge chore in A} as the set of vertices of graph G whose
corresponding vertex agents get one or more edge chores in A. By the above argument, we have that
|V ′| ≤ k. Furthermore, for every edge ej ∈ E, if the edge chore Cj is assigned to vertex agent ai, then
vi,j = 0, meaning that the vertex vi must be adjacent to edge ej . Thus, V ′ is a valid vertex cover, as
desired.
6.7 Additional Experimental Details
Synthetic dataset For synthetic experiments, we work with ve agents and twenty chores. Fol-
lowing the experimental setup of Freeman et al. (2019), we generate 1000 instances with valuations
drawn from the Dirichlet distribution, with the concentration parameter set to 10. For each agent, the
sampling process returns m positive real numbers that sum up to 1. These numbers are multiplied by
a common ‘budget’ (equal to 1000). We then round up these numbers (in order to ensure integrality)
and ip their sign (for chores). Finally, in order to restore normalization, a good is selected uniformly
at random and the agent’s valuation for that good is increased by 1. This process is repeated until the
(integral) valuations sum up to the budget (i.e., become normalized).
Spliddit dataset As mentioned previously in Section 4, Spliddit allows the users to specify the num-
ber of copies of each chore, and express their preferences in the form of multipliers. The website further
assumes that each agent’s valuation for the grand bundle (i.e., all copies of all chores) is−100, and uses
this assumption to infer the exact numerical preferences of the agents from the multipliers.
We perform one rounding step and two pruning steps on the dataset obtained from Spliddit, as
follows:
• We round down (i.e., away from zero) each agent’s valuation for each copy of every chore to
ensure integrality. Note that the rounded valuations might no longer be normalized.
• We remove the instances with fewer chores than agents (i.e., m < n), since any matching of
chores to agents satises EQ1/EQX for these instances.
• We remove instances with more than 1000 copies of any chore. This choice is made because
the aforementioned rounding step typically results in instances where all copies of all chores are
valued at −1 for every agent, leading to trivial instances.
The aforementioned pruning steps bring down the number of instances from 2889 to 2613. As
mentioned earlier, in the pruned dataset, the number of agents ranges between 2 and 15, and the
number of chore ranges between 3 and 1100.
Spliddit algorithm Spliddit implements the following two-step randomized algorithm:19
• First, a linear program is used to compute an egalitarian-equivalent solution (Pazner and Schmei-
dler, 1978), i.e., a fractional allocation that is perfectly equitable and minimizes the agents’ disutil-
ities. From a generalization of the Birkho-von Neumann theorem (Budish et al., 2013), it follows
that this fractional solution can be expressed a distribution over integral allocations wherein all
copies of a chore are assigned to the same agent. The said fractional allocation is therefore ex
ante equitable.
• Next, another linear program is used to construct the aforementioned distribution, and subse-
quently an integral allocation is sampled from this distribution so that the expected number of
chores assigned to each agent is preserved.
19http://www.spliddit.org/apps/tasks
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